Introduction
The slavery controversy was the most important single influence on American constitutional development before the Civil War. It under lay the struggle for sectional advantage that took place during the six crises of the union: 1783-1788, 1819-1821, 1832, 1846-18 50, 1854, and 1860-1 861. There were other great constitutional con troversies in the antebellum period: creation of a national govern ment, establishment of judicial review, charter of a national bank, restriction of speech. Each had its day and shaped our constitution, but none proved to be as lasting or as divisive as the ongoing effort to restrict or pr o tect the enslavement of black people. In the end, the slavery controversy proved its potency by destroying the union.
Five of the crises of the union directly involved the expansion or security of slavery outside the existing slave states. Leaving aside the Nullification crisis of 1832, all the crises of the union after the first occurred when southerners perceived a threat to the security of slavery at times when the nation was about to expand again into the western empire. The crises occurred because some question about the place of slavery in the western empire had not yet been resolved, and all but the last were settled by a constitutional compromise of that question.
Because slavery had been regulated by law in all the mainland colonies during the eighteenth century, 1 Americans in the early years of national independence neither questioned its legitimacy in the states where it survived nor believed that the federal government could abolish it in those states. This assumption will be called the "federal consensus." Its correlative tenets were: (1) only the states could abolish or in any way regulate slavery within their jurisdictions; (2) the federal government had no power over slavery in the states. It followed that the only proper posture of the national government with respect to slavery was strict laissez faire, except for one problem (the international slave trade ) over which it had explicit constitutional powers, another (fugitive slaves) arguably within its regulatory ambit, and a third (slave insurrections) implicitly so. The crises of the union did not directly involve the security of slavery in the extant states; they related only to slavery in the territories or new states. No one, until the emergence of radical constitutional abolitionists in the 1840s, thought to challenge the federal consensus.
The consensus was threatened, however, by a momentous shift in outlook that took place within the antislavery movement around 1830-the appearance of immediatism. Before the 1830s, organized antislavery was moderate in spirit, gradualistic, and oriented to grappling with slavery at the state and local level. When the Ameri can Anti-Slavery Society was founded in 1833 around the demand for the immediate abolition of slavery, and when it directed its interests more conspicuously toward federal action than its predecessors had done, defenders of slavery sensed a challenge to the security of slavery in the extant states. The AA-SS repeatedly denied that it harbored any such intention, but it failed to convince slavery's champions.
The federal consensus assumed the legitimacy of slavery in the states where it existed. In 1838, five years after the founding of the AA-SS, a coterie of abolitionists adopted the position that slavery was everywhere illegitimate. They rejected the federal consensus and tried, unsuccessfully, to have the AA-SS repudiate it. This group will be referred to as the radical constitutionalists, "radical" because they rejected the consensus, "constitutionalists" because they sought to abolish slavery by constitutional action.
The radicals' challenge, together with a disagreement over the wisdom of organizing an antislavery third party, split the organized movement. In addition to the radicals, two other abolitionist groups emerged in the 1840s: Garrisonians and moderate constitutionalists. Both, in differin g ways, su p ported the consensus. The Garrisonians b y 1844 maintained that the Constitution supported slavery and was a proslavery compact. They therefore condemned it, urged disunion and personal disallegiance, and denounced the Liberty party, which had become the vehicle for supporters of antislavery third-party action. Moderate constitutionalists defended the consensus, but de manded that the federal government be divorced from any support of slavery. They hoped that the removal of federal support, coupled with vigorous antislavery political involvement either through the Liberty party or in one of the regular parties, would render slavery so vul nerable that the states would abolish it of their own accord.
The moderates in 1846 to 1848 coalesced with nonabolitionists from the regular parties on a platform of opposition to the extension of slavery into the new territories acquired in the Mexican War. The catalyst for this fusion was the Wilmot Proviso, first introduced in 1846, which would have forbidden the establishment of slavery in any of the erstwhile Mexican territories. The Proviso also marked the transit of abolitionist constitutionalism from one era to another. Be fore the Proviso, the controversy over slavery was waged over a wide range of issues, of which the problem of slavery in the territories was only one among several. After 1846, however, the extension of slav ery into the territories became the overriding issue, eclipsing all others in national politics except that of fugitive slaves, which was decidedly subordinate. Constitutional development after 1848 was so radically different from what had gone before, and its political configurations so changed, that it must be the subject of separate investigation. Hence the terminal date of this study.
Except for the Garrisonians, who looked only backward, abolition ists tried to describe what the Constitution had been, what it was in their present, and what it could or should become, and they some times did these three things simultaneously, confusing past and future in a fused "is." Aileen Kraditor assumes agreement among modern historians that the Garrisonian inter p retation of the Constitution is the "correct one," but that judgment requires severe qualification. 2 Garrisonians and defenders of slavery were correct in seeing a tra-jectory of development, along which the Constitution was forced to ward an ever more proslavery character, and their judgment was validated in that summa of proslavery constitutionalism, the Dred Scott case. But this view was valid only looking backward in time; the trajectory was neither necessary nor inevitable. There is much to be said for the radical position, looking forward in time, which tried to discern what the constitution might be.
Four prominent abolitionists vaguely grasped this idea. Lewis Tappan When public opinion is rectified there will be no difficulty, I apprehend, in bringing about the abolition of slavery in this country constitutionally.3
William Goodell approvingly quoted an unnamed lawyer who re marked to him that "the lawyers argue from the constitution, as it is now perverted. The present mis-inter p retation of it they make their starting point." This perverted interpretation had become so canoni cal, admitted Edwin W. Clarke, that the radical abolitionist interpre tation was "visionary." But then so had been the ideas of Granville Sharp when he launched his seemingly futile crusade against slavery in England in 1768, and if English courts could be brought around to Sharp's antislavery, so might American courts, once disenthralled of their subservience to the Slave Power. 4 Samuel J. May, reflecting on intramural abolitionist conflicts, noted that Garrisonians maintained the American constitution was pro-slavery, while the moderates and radicals insisted it was antislavery, but "it seemed to me that it might be whichever the people pleased to make it."5 May touched on the essential character of Everyman's Constitution: it was, and is, whatever the American people are pleased to make it, and they may alter it in modes other than formal amendment.
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